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I.  Introduction 
“Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and 
local governments[;] . . . it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be 
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an 
education.  Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to 
provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal 
terms.”1 
The landmark decision of Brown v. Board of Education2 set the 
precedent for the judiciary’s role in policymaking in public education, and 
since the decision, the role has evolved to the point of being commonplace 
in America.3  The majority view is that the Court’s active role in Brown was 
                                                                                                     
 1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
 2. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that de jure 
discrimination was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 3. See Frank J. Macchiarola et al., The Judicial System and Equality in Schooling, 23 
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 567, 567 (1996) (stating that since the decision in Brown, the judiciary 
has increasingly become involved in resolving education issues, even those outside of the 
Constitution). 
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necessary to alleviate a crisis in education that had been prolonged and 
exacerbated by majoritarian politics, and had it not been for the courts, de-
segregation would not have occurred.4  The most effective way to correct 
this crisis was to put the decision in the hands of the judiciary. 
Today, America’s public schools face a similar crisis in the form of 
state-mandated seniority layoff policies—more commonly known as “last 
hired, first fired”—in which school districts use seniority to determine 
layoff decisions during “reductions-in-force,” or “RIFs.”5  While an 
overwhelming majority of school districts use seniority as the most 
important factor in layoff decisions, most states do not mandate that 
seniority be the determinant factor.6  Fourteen states, however, actually 
mandate seniority policies.7 
“Last hired, first fired” policies deny children the right to an adequate 
education by creating an unstable education environment, replete with 
overcrowded classrooms and high teacher turnover.8  As discussed more 
thoroughly infra, these education rights are legally enforceable, the denial 
of which results in a violation of these students’ civil rights.9  “Last hired, 
first fired” laws widen the education gap between minority and other 
students, as high poverty inner-city schools are disproportionately affected 
by these policies.10  Despite the detrimental effects of seniority-based 
layoffs, little attention has been paid to this issue.  If “last hired, first fired” 
policies continue unchecked, poor and minority students will continue to 
fall further behind as they are denied their constitutional right to an equal 
educational opportunity. 
Unlike the heavily-litigated issue of education finance reform, until 
very recently courts had largely remained silent on the issue of “last hired, 
first fired” policies in assessing the constitutionality of education rights.11  
                                                                                                     
 4. See JENNIFER L. HOCKSCHILD, THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA:  LIBERAL 
DEMOCRACY AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 134 (1984) (“[W]ere it not for [the] courts, there 
would be little reduction in racial isolation [in public schooling].”). 
 5. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, TEACHER LAYOFFS: RE-THINKING 
“LAST-HIRED, FIRST FIRED” POLICIES 3 (2010), available at http://www.nctq.org 
/p/docs/nctq_dc_layoffs.pdf (describing the process for district-wide layoffs). 
 6. See id. at 6. 
 7. See id. (discussing the various state and district layoff policies). 
 8. See discussion infra Part II.C. (detailing the negative effects of seniority-based 
layoff policies). 
 9. See discussion infra Part II.E. (suggesting that denial of education rights through 
“last hired, first fired” policies is the civil rights issue of our time). 
 10. See id. 
 11. See Amy L. Moore, When Enough Isn’t Enough: Qualitative and Quantitative 
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The silence was broken with the January 2011 California Superior Court 
decision in Reed v. State of California,12 which approved a class action 
settlement halting “last hired, first fired” layoffs in the Los Angeles Unified 
School District.13  Some academics have predicted that the decision in Reed 
could spark a new wave of education litigation to reform “last hired, first 
fired” policies.14  This Note will argue that “last hired, first fired” policies 
adversely affect students’ educational rights and must be reformed.  While 
Reed is the first case to address these policies, it is possible to analyze the 
role of the judiciary in education finance reform in order to predict whether 
the judiciary will be an effective vehicle to bring about reform of state-
mandated seniority layoff policies, and how the courts will affect the 
reform. 
Part Two of this Note will provide an overview of “last hired, first 
fired” policies, how they manifest themselves in different states and school 
districts, the adverse effect they have on students’ educational opportunity, 
and why such policies are ripe for reform.  Part Three will analyze state 
constitutional provisions as a mechanism for reform by addressing three 
factors: the qualifying language of a state constitution’s education clause, 
the state’s rejection or acceptance of education as a fundamental right, and 
the state’s success in education finance reform.  Part Three will also 
analyze the emerging jurisprudence in order to determine the most effective 
way to succeed in “last hired, first fired” reform, comparing “equity” claims 
to “adequacy claims” using two recent reform cases.  Finally, Part Four will 
propose that emerging jurisprudence provides two viable options for “last 
hired, first fired” reform, depending on each state’s acceptance or rejection 
of education as a fundamental right, and will address solutions to potential 
reform challenges. 
                                                                                                     
Assessments of Adequate Education in State Constitutions by State Supreme Courts, 41 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 545, 546-47 (2010). 
 12. No. BC432420 1 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2011) (determining that seniority-
based layoff policies violated students’ rights to an equal educational opportunity). 
 13. See id. (approving the proposed class action settlement that haled layoffs for up to 
forty-five schools). 
 14. See Simone Wilson, L.A. Teachers Union Loses Historic Lawsuit to ACLU: No 
More ‘Last Hired, First Fired’ L.A. WEEKLY, (Jan. 21, 2011, 3:30 PM),  http://blogs. 
laweekly.com/informer/2011/01/aclu_wins_lawsuit_utla_seniori.php (last visited Mar. 2, 
2012) (describing the potential effects of the Reed decision on other states). 
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II.  Background: State-Mandated Seniority Layoff Policies in Public 
Schools:  “Last Hired, First Fired” 
In the face of tangible problems such as funding disparities and class 
sizes, teacher quality is a facet often overlooked in education reform 
analysis.15  Studies have shown, however, that teacher effectiveness is a 
powerful tool in implementing student outcomes nationally.16  One study 
suggests increasing the effectiveness of teachers by one deviation—for 
example, from “average” to “very good,”—produces the same effect as 
decreasing a class size by thirteen students.17  The New Teacher Project 
published a study addressing the “Widget Effect:” “The tendency to treat 
teachers like interchangeable parts rather than individual professionals, 
based on the false assumption that one teacher is the same as another.”18  
The “Widget Effect” illustrates the problem inherent in “last hired, first 
fired” policies. 
A.  “Last Hired, First Fired” Defined 
1.  Reductions-in-Force 
“Last hired, first fired” policies come into play during district-wide 
layoffs, known as reductions-in-force, (or “RIFs”) in which districts are not 
contractually obligated to reassign teachers, meaning that teachers lose not 
just their current assignments, but also their jobs.19  Usually, when a 
teaching position is cut because of a program or school closing, teacher 
contracts guarantee new assignments.20  During a district-wide layoff (RIF), 
                                                                                                     
 15. See THE NEW TEACHER PROJECT, How Federal Education Policy Can Reverse the 
Widget Effect:  Transforming ESEA Title II to Improve Teacher Effectiveness and Student 
Outcomes 3 (2006), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED518132.pdf (“An outsized 
focus on class size reduction perpetuates the widget effect by overlooking and failing to act 
upon the differences in effectiveness among teachers.”). 
 16. See id. (stating that research has shown teacher effectiveness to have a greater 
impact than reducing class size). 
 17. See id. (comparing the importance of effective teachers to the importance of 
reducing class size). 
 18. THE NEW TEACHER PROJECT, The Widget Effect:  Our National Failure to 
Acknowledge and Act on Differences in Teacher Effectiveness (2009), available at 
http://widgeteffect.org/downloads/%20TheWidgetEffect.pdf. 
 19. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, supra note 5, at 3 (distinguishing 
layoffs from the “routine ebb and flow of positions among a district’s individual schools that 
occur every school year”). 
 20. See id. (explaining the reassignment process for routine position cuts). 
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however, districts have no contractual obligation to reassign teachers.21  
Declining enrollment in public schools, inadequate financing, and the 
elimination of programs all result in RIFs, triggering these last hired, first 
fired policies.22  Currently, The New Teacher Project places fourteen states 
at “high risk,” meaning those states mandate quality-blind layoffs during 
RIFS, thirty-three states are at “medium risk,” where they leave the 
decision to local school districts or allow (but do not require) multiple 
factors to be considered during RIFs, and three states are at “low risk,” 
requiring that teacher performance be a major factor in layoff decisions.23 
2.  How the Policies Work 
Seniority-based layoff polices come by several names, such as “last 
hired, first fired” or “last in, first out” (also known as “LIFO”), but they all 
work in largely the same way in every district that employs them.24  The 
district first determines the layoff pool, either by targeting a particular grade 
or subject area—in which all teachers in that grade or subject area are 
included—or decides to make reductions in every grade, in which case 
every teacher is included in the layoff pool.25  Once the pool is determined, 
districts with state-mandated seniority-based layoff policies have no 
discretion in selecting which teachers are fired—those with the least 
seniority are the first to go.26  In other words, “last hired, first fired.” 
                                                                                                     
 21. See id. (contrasting normal position cut policies with district-wide layoff policies).  
 22. See BONNIE B. TAYLOR, EDUCATION AND THE LAW:  A DICTIONARY 202 (1996) 
(defining “reductions-in-force”). 
 23. See THE NEW TEACHER PROJECT, The Case Against Quality-Blind Teacher Layoffs. 
Why Policies that Ignore Teacher Quality Need to End Now 1 (Feb. 2011),  
http://tntp.org/assets/documents/TNTP_Case_Against_Quality_Blind_Layoffs_Feb2011F.pd
f?files/TNTP_Case_Against_Quality_Blind_Layoffs_Feb2011F.pdf (illustrating the layoff 
risk level for each state). 
 24. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, supra note 5, at 3 (describing the 
layoff process for districts that employ seniority based layoff policies). 
 25. See id. (describing how districts determine the pool of teachers eligible to be laid 
off ). 
 26. See id. (describing the layoff process in districts with state-mandated seniority 
layoff policies). 
RIF’D OFF  475 
B.  How “Last Hired, First Fired” Policies Are Manifested in Public 
Schools 
1.  Bargaining Agreements 
Because states have governance over public schools, it is within each 
state’s discretion whether districts can engage in collective bargaining; all 
states except five, however, currently require or permit collective 
bargaining.27  With the exception of Hawaii (where teachers negotiate 
employment agreements at a statewide level), bargaining occurs at the 
district level between the board of education and a union representative.28 
State policy, however, still influences collective bargaining in a number of 
ways, such as prohibiting strikes or dictating the terms of arbitration.29  
Currently, thirty-four states require collective bargaining for public sector 
employees, eleven states permit collective bargaining, and five states 
explicitly prohibit collective bargaining.30 
In collective bargaining agreements, the principle of seniority often 
occurs in three forms:  determining compensation, determining the order in 
which teachers are transferred, and—most importantly to this discussion—
determining the order in which teachers are laid off during RIFs.31  Of the 
forty-five states that allow collective bargaining, three states—California, 
Nevada, and Iowa—have layoff policies that are a mandatory subject of 
bargaining.32  Illinois and Ohio permit layoffs to be a subject of bargaining, 
while five states prohibit layoffs policies to be a subject of bargaining: 
Idaho, Wisconsin, Michigan, Indiana, and Tennessee.  Every other state 
                                                                                                     
 27. See Emily Cohen, Kate Walsh & RiShawn Biddle, Invisible Ink in Collective 
Bargaining:  Why Key Issues Are Not Addressed, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, 
July 2008, at 4 (assessing the state role in establishing the scope of bargaining). 
 28. See M. Finch and T. Nagel, Collective Bargaining in the Public Schools:  
Reassessing Labor Policy in an Era of Reform, WIS. L. REV. 1573, 1579 (1984) (discussing 
the recent growth of teacher unionism and collective bargaining). 
 29. See Michael Colasanti, State Collective Bargaining Policies for Teachers, State 
Notes, Education Commission of the States, Jan. 2008, at 1 (addressing each state’s policy 
with regard to collective bargaining agreements). 
 30. See James Joyner, Public Employee Bargaining Rights, OUTSIDE THE BELTWAY 
(Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/public-employee-bargaining-rights/ 
(providing a map of collective bargaining rights by state). 
 31. See id. 
 32. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY TR3 DATABASE: TEACHERS’ RULES, 
ROLES, AND RIGHTS, State Bargaining Rules, http://www.nctq.org/tr3/scope/ (last visited 
Feb. 21, 2013) (illustrating the bargaining policies of each state). 
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either fails to address the issue in state law or administrative code, or has no 
state statute regarding public sector collective bargaining.33 
2.  State Law 
From a historical perspective, the state legislatures have been the most 
common tool for regulating the operation of public schools, either directly 
or through state boards of education.34  Many school governance decisions 
are relegated to individual school districts, but certain elements such as 
licensing standards and the extent they are enforced are governed at the 
state level.35  With regard to RIFs, many states leave layoff determination 
criteria to the individual school districts.36  Fourteen states, however, have 
mandated “last hired, first fired” policies:  Alaska, California, Hawaii, 
Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.37 
C.  The Negative Effects of “Last Hired, First Fired” 
The problem inherent in “last hired, first fired” policies is very similar 
to the problem vocalized by the “Widget Effect,” i.e. teachers are not 
evaluated based on quality or effectiveness.  In the District of Columbia, 
this lack of attention to teacher quality resulted in widespread controversy 
surrounding District layoffs.38  When Washington, D.C. Schools Chancellor 
Michelle Rhee performed a layoff of close to 400 teacherS in 2009, she 
took advantage of the fact that the District does not have mandated 
seniority-based layoff policies.39  She refused to use seniority as a 
determining factor in who would be laid off, basing her decision on a D.C. 
                                                                                                     
 33. See id. 
 34. See EDUCATION POLICY AND THE LAW 438 (David L. Kirp et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992) 
(providing an overview of the reform, regulation, and restructuring of public school 
systems). 
 35. See Linda Darling-Hammond, Teacher Quality and Student Achievement:  A 
Review of State Policy Evidence, 8 EDU. POLICY ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 1, 10 (2000) (providing 
an overview of the differences in state policy regarding teaching). 
 36. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, supra note 5, at 6 (detailing states’ 
latitude in last hired, first fired policies). 
 37. See THE NEW TEACHER PROJECT, supra note 23, at 6 (summarizing state latitude in 
determining criteria for teacher layoff policies). 
 38.  See id. at 5 (“The lack of attention to teacher quality inherent in this process is one 
of the reasons why Washington, DC’s layoffs raised so much controversy.”). 
 39. See id. at 1 (summarizing the controversy surrounding the 2009 D.C. layoff). 
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Regulation clause that made “school needs” the determining factor rather 
than seniority.40 
In the wake of the D.C. controversy, the National Council on Teacher 
Quality (NCTQ) conducted a study to examine district policies for making 
layoff decisions in order to answer the important question emphasized by 
the D.C. decision:  “what factors should be considered when school districts 
must decide who will stay and who will go?”41  The study examined data 
from 100 school districts, representing twenty percent of all public schools 
in the United States.42 
The study found that seniority-based layoff policies have several 
legitimate advantages:  the system is objective, protects those teachers who 
are most invested in a school district, and supports teachers who would 
have the most trouble finding a new job late in their careers.43  Proponents 
of “last hired, first fired” policies also contend that the system benefits 
students by providing them with more experienced teachers.44  The NCTQ 
study, however, firmly rejects the longstanding assumption that experience 
correlates to quality.45  Other studies have reached the same conclusion 
when measuring teacher effectiveness over time.  One study conducted in 
2009, Assessing the Potential of Using Value-Added Estimates of Teacher 
Job Performance for Making Tenure, concluded that after three years of 
teaching, teachers generally hit a plateau and no longer increase in teaching 
effectiveness, thus illustrating that third-year teachers are no less effective 
than long-tenured teachers.46  Another study even suggests that long-
tenured teachers decrease in performance toward the end of their careers.  
In sum, as one study stated, “[w]hile the simplicity and transparency of a 
                                                                                                     
 40. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, supra note 5, at 1 (describing the legal 
basis on which the D.C. Chancellor rested her decision to base her layoff decision on factors 
other than seniority). 
 41. Id. 
 42. See id. (providing an overview of the Teacher Rules, Roles, and Rights (TR3) 
database used to conduct the study). 
 43. See id. at 1–2 (outlining seniority’s pros and cons). 
 44. See id. at 2 (“It has long been assumed that a seniority system produces the best 
results for children, under the assertion that the most experienced teachers are better 
teachers.”). 
 45. See id. (stating that the assumption that most experienced teachers are better 
teachers proves not to be true). 
 46. See Dan Goldhaber & Michael Hansen, Assessing the Potential of Using Value-
Added Estimates of Teacher Job Performance for Making Tenure Decisions (Nat’l Ctr. for 
Analysis of Longitudinal Data in Educ. Research, Working Paper No. 31, 2010), available at 
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/1001369_assessing_the_potential.pdf. 
478 19 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 469 (2013) 
seniority-based system certainly has advantages, it is hard to argue that it is 
a system in the best interest of student achievement.”47 
Additionally, the NCTQ study illustrates that “last hired, first fired” 
policies indirectly lead to an increase in classroom size.  Because new 
teachers cost less than tenured teachers, when districts use seniority-based 
layoff policies they are forced to fire a greater number of teachers.48  Firing 
a greater number of teachers naturally results in fewer teachers per district 
and therefore increased class sizes.  The study gives an illustration of 
closing a ten million dollar deficit in a district serving 34,500 children with 
a current average class size of 23 students.  The study estimates the cost of 
a twenty-year veteran at $100,000, meaning 100 teachers would be fired 
and class sizes would increase from twenty-three to twenty-five.49  In 
contrast, the cost of a new teacher is estimated at $50,000, resulting in a 
layoff of twice as many teachers and an increased classroom size from 
twenty-three to twenty-seven.50  Other comparisons to seniority-neutral 
models yield similar results.  One researcher from the University of 
Washington suggests that  a nationwide ten percent school budget cut, 
allowing districts to look at factors other than seniority, could save over 
250,000 jobs.51  Studies have shown that these increases in class size have a 
direct effect on student achievement, especially in the lower grades.52 
Moreover, it is not just an assumption that seniority-based rather than 
quality-based layoff policies result in a less effective corps of teachers.  
According to two recent studies, only thirteen to sixteen percent of the 
teachers laid off in a seniority-based system would also have been given 
pink slips in a quality of effectiveness based system, meaning that more 
than eighty percent of seniority-based layoffs would result in more effective 
teachers being cut.53  These studies also found that ineffective teachers 
                                                                                                     
 47. Dan Goldhaber & Roddy Theobold, Assessing the Determinants and Implications 
of Teachers Layoffs (Nat’l Ctr. for Analysis of Longitudinal Data in Educ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 55, 2010), available at http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/1001496-
Assessing-Teacher-Layoffs.pdf. 
 48. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, supra note 5, at 2 (illustrating that 
seniority-based layoffs lead to more jobs lost and consequently larger classroom sizes). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See id. (referencing the research of Marguerite Roza, which suggests that 
switching to a seniority neutral policy could reduce teacher layoffs from 875,000 to 612,000 
in a 10% nation-wide school budget cut).  
 52. See Steven G. Rivkin, Eric A. Hanushek, & John F. Kain, Teachers, Schools, and 
Academic Achievement, 73 ECONOMETRICA 417, 444–45 (2005). 
 53. See THE NEW TEACHER PROJECT, supra note 23, at 4; see also Goldhaber 
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result in 2.5 to 3.5 fewer months’ worth of academic progress in one year, 
compared to a teacher of average effectiveness.54 
D.  The Need for “Last Hired, First Fired” Reform 
Despite the problems inherent in seniority-based layoff policies, 
seventy-five percent of the districts analyzed in the NCTQ study use 
seniority as the determining factor in teacher layoffs.55  As previously 
noted, while many states leave layoff determination criteria to the 
individual school districts, fourteen states have mandated “last hired, first 
fired” policies.56  The NCTQ urges states to pass laws mandating teacher 
performance as the determinant factor rather than seniority:  “Because state 
law trumps local policy, even that of collectively bargained contracts, any 
state could pass a law that requires performance to be a factor in layoffs.”57  
Such a policy would be in line with other white-collar professions where 
seniority-based layoff policies are very uncommon.58 While states could 
pass these laws, the more pertinent question is whether they will exercise 
this power.  Currently, only Arizona has a law prohibiting seniority from 
being used as the determinant factor in teacher layoffs.59  As analyzed 
below, this Note predicts that prohibition of “last hired, first fired” policies 
could become the next wave of education reform. 
                                                                                                     
&,Hansen, supra note 46. 
 54. See THE NEW TEACHER PROJECT, supra note 23, at 5 (explaining why seniority-
based layoffs drag down student achievement). 
 55. See id. at 4 (providing an overview of the current policies in 100 districts in the 
TR3 database).  In the twenty-five districts where seniority was not determinant, sixteen 
districts used teacher performances as a weightier factor, six districts used a case-by-case 
determination (though usually seniority-based) and three districts used multiple criteria. See 
id. 
 56. See id. at 6 (summarizing state latitude in determining criteria for teacher layoff 
policies). 
 57. See NAT’L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, supra note 5, at 6. 
 58. See id. at 1 (“The factory model approach of last-hired, first-fired is unusual 
among white collar professions.  For example, struggling newspapers have usually chosen to 
buy out fewer senior, higher paid employees rather than layoff larger numbers of younger, 
less-expensive employees.”). 
 59. See id. at 6. 
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E.  “The Civil Rights Issue of Our Time” 
Until very recently, education reform has focused predominantly on 
education finance.60 During this time, the courts were largely silent on other 
matters of education quality.61  The evolution from federal to state law and 
from equity to adequacy illustrated in the evolution of reform strongly 
suggest that the new wave of reform could move away from finance and 
toward teacher quality.  President Obama has called education reform the 
“civil rights issue of our time” and has made efforts to eliminate 
achievement gaps between minorities and other students.62   Speaking to 
teacher effectiveness specifically, he has said,  “I reject a system that 
rewards failure and protects a person from its consequences.  The stakes are 
too high.  We can afford nothing but the best when it comes to our 
children’s teachers and the schools where they teach.”63 
“Last hired, first fired” policies affect inner-city (and consequently 
minority) students more than others. Research shows that reverse-seniority 
layoffs hit inner-city schools the hardest because less-experienced teachers 
tend to aggregate there.64  For example, one report concluded that teacher 
layoffs would be unevenly distributed in the Los Angeles Unified School 
District, the school district at issue in Reed,  because the district was forced 
to use “last hired, first fired” policies.65  Because twenty percent of the 
                                                                                                     
 60. See William F. Dietz, Manageable Adequacy Standards in Education Reform 
Litigation, 74 WASH. U. L. REV. 1193, 1193 (1996) (discussing the three waves of education 
finance reform).  Reform has typically been categorized into three waves: The Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of state 
constitutions, and education adequacy under state constitutions.  See id. at 1193–94. 
 61. See K.T. Cochran, Beyond School Financing:  Defining the Constitutional Rights 
to an Adequate Education, 78 N.C. L. Rev. 399, 399–400 (2000) (“American courts have 
steadfastly refused to hold teachers and school systems liable for failing to educate 
individual students.  Despite widespread concern about the quality of education offered in 
the nation’s public schools, state courts have refused to hear so-called ‘educational 
malpractice’ claims brought against local schools.”). 
 62. See Helene Cooper, “Obama Takes Aim at Inequality in Education,” N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 6, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/07/us/politics 
/07obama.html?_r=0  (describing President Obama’s goals for education reform). 
 63. President Barack Obama, Remarks at the meeting of the Hispanic Chamber of 
Commerce (Mar. 10, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_ 
press_office/Remarks-of-the-President-to-the-United-States-Hispanic-Chamber-of-
Commerce). 
 64. See Mark Osmond, Taking Failing Schools to Court, EDUCATIONNEXT (Sept. 12, 
2011), http://educationnext.org/taking-failing-schools-to-court/.  
 65. See INSTITUTE FOR DEMOCRACY, EDUCATION, AND ACCESS, Sharing the Burden? 
The Impact of Proposed Teacher Layoffs Across LAUSD, http://idea.gseis.ucla.edu/ 
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district’s first-year and second-year teachers are assigned to high-poverty 
schools that have high concentrations of minority students, these students 
would be the most adversely affected.66  The New Teacher Project asserts 
that in seniority-based layoffs, the poorest schools are subject to 25% more 
layoffs than the wealthiest schools.67  Another study reports: 
Also problematic is the uneven effect seniority-based layoffs may have 
on various schools. It has been extensively documented that in higher-
poverty, higher-minority schools, teachers tend to be less experienced 
than their colleagues at wealthier, lower-minority schools. Where these 
patterns hold, minority and poor students will undoubtedly see more 
turnover in their teachers from seniority-based layoffs. When this 
happens, the district’s remaining teachers are shuffled as staff are 
imported from elsewhere in the district to backfill some of the disparate 
teacher losses in schools with more junior teachers.68 
As such, seniority-based layoff policies make an ideal candidate for 
reform, now that Reed v. State of California has called the constitutionality 
of such policies into question. 
As shown above, state mandated “last hired, first fired” results in sharp 
declines in teacher quality.  In itself, however, this cannot instigate a new 
wave education reform.  Seniority-based layoff policies very clearly have 
an adverse effect on public school system,69 but until recently, the policies 
were not regarded as unconstitutional.  In Reed, a court for the first time 
addressed this issue of whether the adverse effects of “last hired, first fired” 
policies go so far as to interfere with students’ state constitutional right to 
“basic equality of educational opportunity.”70 
                                                                                                     
publications/files/Layoffs-LAUSD.pdf  (last visited July 24, 2013) (concluding that inner-
city schools are adversely impacted by the state-mandated seniority-based layoff policies in 
California). 
 66. Id. 
 67. See THE NEW TEACHER PROJECT, supra note 23, at 7. 
 68. See Cristina Sepe & Marguerite Roza, Schools in Crisis:  Making Ends Meet. The 
Disproportionate Impact of Seniority-Based Layoffs on Poor, Minority Students, May 20, 
2010, http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED516845.pdf  (highlighting the negative impact of last 
hired, first fired on high-poverty and high-minority schools). 
 69. See discussion supra, Section II.C. (discussing the problems inherent in seniority 
based layoff policies). 
 70. Reed, No. BC432420 at 1 (citing Butt v. State of California, 4 Cal. 4th 668, 685 
(1992)). 
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III.  Analysis:  State Constitutional Provisions as a Mechanism for Reform 
A.  Past Success:  The Story of Education Finance Reform 
1.  The Evolution of the Judiciary’s Role in Education Reform:  Brown v. 
Board of Education and San Antonio Independent School District v. 
Rodriguez 
Until the recent developments in Reed, education reform focused 
primarily on education finance.71  Education finance reform has typically 
been categorized into three waves:  the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the education equity arguments under state 
constitutions, and education adequacy under state constitutions.72  
Beginning with Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, the judiciary began 
to take a more active role in education reform. Although it concerned a 
federal Equal Protection Clause issue, Brown provides an appropriate 
starting point because it illustrates “the special place of educational 
opportunity in our social system as a justification for the exercise of 
searching constitutional review.”73  Nonetheless, after declaring in San 
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez74 that there is no federal 
constitutional right to education, the Supreme Court’s role has been 
somewhat limited.  As the Court stated in Rodriguez: 
Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection 
under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is 
implicitly so protected. As we have said, the undisputed importance of 
education will not alone cause this Court to depart from the usual 
standard for reviewing a State’s social and economic legislation.75 
                                                                                                     
 71. See William F. Dietz, Manageable Adequacy Standards in Education Reform 
Litigation, 74 WASH. U. L. REV. 1193, 1193 (1996) (stating that though the legislative 
branch is obligated to set up education finance, reform of financing systems has often been 
litigation-based). 
 72. See id. at 1193–94 (“Commentators often categorize education reform litigation 
into three waves.”). 
 73. See Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance 
Reform, 48 VAND. L. REV. 101, 117 (1995). 
 74. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that a 
school-financing system based on local property taxes was not unconstitutional because 
education is not a fundamental right). 
 75. Id. at 35. 
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Despite this limitation, “the Supreme Court has provided a framework 
for consideration of certain student rights.”76  These rights, however, have 
been limited to issues of equality and integration.77  While rejecting 
plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment argument, the Court in Rodriguez 
nonetheless explicitly called for state courts to take on the issue through 
state constitutions.78  In the majority opinion, Justice Powell stated that the 
matter should be addressed in state rather than federal courts, using 
“judicial principles sensitive to the nature of the State’s efforts and to the 
rights reserved to the States under the Constitution.”79  Thus, despite the 
limitations in Rodriguez, the judicial system remains a powerful vehicle for 
education reform advocates.80 
2.  The Shift to State Courts 
a.  Equal Protection Claims 
Advocates for education reform thus found an alternative outlet for 
relief—through state constitution clauses.81  While state constitutions vary 
widely, they typically contain a provision synonymous with the Equal 
Protection Clause and an “education clause” that provides for a system of 
public schools, allowing plaintiffs to brings claims of constitutionally 
inadequate schooling.82  When plaintiffs first turned to state law claims in 
the wake of Rodriguez, they brought challenges based on both education 
                                                                                                     
 76.  Macchiarola et al., supra note 3, at 582. 
 77. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 
(1969), Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982). 
 78. See Ken Gormley, Education as a Fundamental Right:  Building a New Paradigm.  
Forum on Public Policy at 207 (“It is important to underscore that the majority of the U.S. 
Supreme Court in San Antonio v. Rodriguez, even as it rejected plaintiffs’ argument that a 
fundamental right to education was buried in the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal 
Constitution, issued a broad invitation for states to examine the issue under their own 
constitutions.”). 
 79. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 39. 
 80. See Dietz, supra note 71, at 1193 (“Litigation has long been a tool of education 
reform advocates.”). 
 81. Josh Kagan, A Civics Action: Interpreting “Adequacy” in State Constitutions’ 
Education Clauses, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2241, 2242 (2003) (“The U.S. Constitution contains 
no clause directly addressing education, thus state constitutions’ education clauses provide 
plaintiffs with claims that could avoid a federal bench unwilling to hear right to education 
cases.”). 
 82. See Enrich, supra note 73, at 105 (providing an overview of state constitution 
education provisions). 
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clauses and equal protection rights.83  Equal protection challenges for 
education reform, however, were not as successful.84  Courts rejected equal 
protection challenges for a myriad of reasons: courts found that students 
were not entitled to equal amounts of funding, that district wealth was not a 
suspect class, and that education was not a fundamental right.85 
b.  Equity Claims 
Thus, courts moved from equal protection clauses to state educational 
clauses—this wave of litigation is commonly referred to as the “equity 
cases.”86  As one scholar described, “[u]nder an equity theory, plaintiffs 
argue that the education clause of the state constitution mandates some 
measure of equality that the state financing laws fail to provide.  The 
remedy they seek is substantial equality of funding for all school 
districts.”87  In this line of cases, courts sidestepped the equal protection 
problems because the focus was not on an equal education generally, but on 
an equal system, including facilities, curriculum, and classroom sizes as 
well as money.88 
However, even under the more versatile groundwork of state education 
clauses, courts were reluctant to require uniformity between funding in 
                                                                                                     
 83. Avidan Y. Cover, Is “Adequacy” A More “Political Question” Than “Equity?:”  
The Effect of Standards-Based Education on Judicial Standards for Education Finance, 11 
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 404 (2002) (describing the initial wave of education 
finance reform). 
 84. See Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 281 (N.J. 1973) (stating a reluctance to 
decide an education reform case upon the State equal protection clause because “the equal 
protection clause may be unmanageable if it is called upon to supply categorical answers in 
the vast area of human needs”); see Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 865 (S. Ct. App. W. 
VA. 1979) (stressing that it would be very difficult to use equal protection as a basis because 
of the demands on inflexible statewide uniformity). 
 85. See Enrich, supra note 73, at 1200 (stating the reasons that the vast majority of 
second-wave challenges failed) (citing Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 
1018 (Colo. 1982); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 770 (Md. 
1983); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989)). 
 86. See Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform 
Litigation, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 317–18 (1991) (“Education clauses provide a basis 
independent of equal protection clauses for rejecting a state’s school finance scheme on 
equity grounds.”). 
 87. See id. at 319. 
 88. See id. at 317 (“Unlike equal protection arguments, education clause arguments do 
not demand an equal education, but an equal system, which involved facilities, curriculum 
offerings, teacher-student ratios, and money.”). 
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different school districts.89  Courts proved hesitant to accept equality 
because of the difficulty in determining what education equality actually 
required, because “state constitutional guarantees of equal protection are 
commonly couched in broad and indefinite terms.”90  Additionally, an 
interest in local power and the immense cost the equalization would place 
on taxpayers have added to the courts’ opposition to equality claims.91  For 
example, in Hornbeck v. Somerset County Board of Education,92 the 
Maryland court failed to find an equity claim in the “thorough and 
efficient” language of the state constitution, instead finding that such 
language mandated some minimum quantum of education.93  This marked 
the next of education reform:  education adequacy under state constitutions. 
c.  Adequacy Claims 
Courts took their cue from Rodriguez, in which the court hinted at a 
possible adequacy claim, stating that “[e]ven if it were conceded that some 
identifiable quantum of education is a constitutionally protected 
prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either right, we have no 
indication that the present levels of educational expenditures in Texas 
provide an education that falls short.”94  In this wave of reform, state 
supreme courts began for the first time to analyze the meaning of adequacy 
in their state constitution education clauses, resulting in a new body of law 
addressing the right to an education.95  The shift to adequacy broadened the 
scope of interpretation because, though the issue was still finance reform, 
the focus was no longer a comparison of monetary distributions, and instead 
shifted to whether the state had fulfilled its constitutional obligation to 
                                                                                                     
 89. See id. at 327 (stating that when state courts denied equity claims, they often held 
that qualifying language such as “thorough and efficient” was never meant to ensure 
uniformity). 
 90. See Enrich, supra note 73, at 163–64. 
 91. See id. at 160 (explaining courts’ reluctance to engage in equity claims). 
 92. See Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ. 458 A.2d 758 (Md. 1983) (holding 
that the state constitution did not mandate equality in per-pupil spending). 
 93.  See id. at 639 (stating that a thorough and efficient education need not be equal). 
 94.  See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36–37 (1973). 
 95. See Allen W. Hubsch, The Emerging Right to Education Under State 
Constitutional Law, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1325, 1325 (1992) (“More recently, plaintiffs in 
education rights litigation have placed greater emphasis on whether the money provided for 
education by the states is minimally adequate to provide the level of education attainment 
required by the education articles of state constitutions.”). 
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provide certain quality of educational opportunity.96  The details of the 
equity versus adequacy arguments will be discussed in more detail infra, 
but here they serve to illustrate the evolution of education reform from 
federal to state courts, and from equal protection to education clause 
arguments.97 
This evolution, however, was hardly clear-cut; in many decisions, 
courts addressed both equity and adequacy claims.98  Well into the 
evolution of the adequacy claims, courts were still addressing equality 
problems; in Ohio, for instance, the court focused primarily on the disparity 
between the richest and poorest school districts.99  As one noted education 
reform scholar described, “[d]espite this momentous shift in the legal and 
substantive educational underpinnings of school finance litigation and 
despite the modestly visible shift toward a more reform-oriented state 
judiciary in school finance cases, a review of the judicial opinions in the 
‘third wave’ cases suggests that education reform litigation in the 1990’s 
was hardly monolithic.”100 
B.  The Role of the State Legislatures in Education Reform 
Advocates of “last hired, first fired” reform will—as they did in 
finance reform—face the issue of judicial deference to the state 
legislature.101  The landmark case for this conflict was Lujan v. Colorado,102 
which, though not a Supreme Court case, established a trend for rational 
basis review of education legislation.103  Other states followed Lujan’s lead.  
                                                                                                     
 96. See id. (describing the evolution of education finance reform challenges from 
equity to adequacy). 
 97. See discussion infra Part III.E.1–2. 
 98. See William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: A Re-
Examination of the Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance Reform Litigation, 43 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1185, 1192-93 (2003) (noting that “a review of the judicial opinions 
in the “third wave” cases suggests that educational reform litigation in the 1990’s was hardly 
monolithic. First, in those judicial opinions, one sees as much talk of ‘equity’ as 
‘adequacy’”). 
 99. See generally DeRolph v. Ohio, 677 N.E. 2d 733, 746 (Ohio 1997). 
 100. See generally Koski, supra note 98, at 1192–93. 
 101.  See  Hubsch, supra note 95, at 1326 (1992) (“The single most difficult issue facing 
advocates of educational entitlement is state judicial deference to the state legislatures’ 
efforts to establish and maintain a state-wide system of education.”). 
 102. Lujan v. Colorado, 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982) (rejecting a challenge to the state 
school funding system that was based on the state’s education clause). 
 103. See id. at 1022 (refusing to apply strict scrutiny to legislation involving economic 
and social policy). 
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This standard of review asks only whether a state legislature’s school 
financing system rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose.104 
The main argument set forth by critics of judicial activism in education 
reform is that educational adequacy is largely a legislative issue.105  
Consequently, the most difficult issue facing state courts is deference to 
state legislative attempts to create state-wide systems of education.106  
Furthermore, the judiciary has no federal constitutional right to an 
education to fall back upon; the Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez stated explicitly that there is no fundamental 
right to an education under the Constitution.107  The Supreme Court’s 
dismissal of a federal constitutional right, however, does not circumvent the 
judiciary’s role in education reform, and in the past quarter century 
education reform has slowly worked its way into the courtroom, but not 
through federal rights.108  Instead, the issue is relegated to state courts.109  
While the Supreme Court might have rejected a federal constitutional right 
to an education, nearly every state constitution notes a right to an 
education.110  In order for the judiciary to play an active role in reforming 
state mandated seniority layoff policies, the argument must be framed to 
portray education as a state constitutional right. 
                                                                                                     
 104 See id. (“Having concluded  that no suspect class or fundamental right is involved, 
the remaining step in equal protection analysis is to determine whether the Colorado public 
school finance system rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose.”). 
 105. See Martha McCarthy & Paul Deigan, What Legally Constitutes an Adequate 
Public Education? A Review of Constitutional, Legislative, and Judicial Mandates, PHI 
DELTA KAPPA EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION 54 (explaining that most states impose statutory 
program specifications in order to gauge educational adequacy). 
 106. See Hubsch, supra note 95, at 1326 (noting that the complexity of education issues 
and the controversial nature of judicial activism in education cause state courts to defer to 
the legislature). 
 107. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) 
(“Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal 
Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.”). 
 108. See Hubsch, supra note 95 at 1326 (noting that since the 1970s, state supreme 
courts have begun to address the issue of state constitutional education clause meanings). 
 109. See id. (“Recently, several state courts have, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, 
begun to determine whether education articles in state constitutions contain a legally 
enforceable constitutional guarantee.”). 
 110. See Kagan, supra note 81, at 2241–42 (noting that after Rodriguez, education 
advocates turned to state education clauses, since nearly every state constitution requires the 
state to provide its children with an education). 
488 19 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 469 (2013) 
C.  Analyzing the Language of Education Clauses 
The education clauses of each state vary somewhat in the language 
used to establish a duty to maintain and fund public schools, though the 
vaguely-worded statutes leave much room for interpretation.111  Since 1971 
when the first major school-funding suit was filed in California, forty-five 
state courts have addressed challenges to the constitutionality of state 
funding for public schools.112  As one scholar notes, “[t]he jurisprudential 
logic employed by state courts in invalidating school funding provisions has 
been as varied as the provisions they have relied on.”113  Wording ranges 
from “general and uniform,” “general and efficient,” “quality,” “high 
quality,” and “sufficient.”114  As such, “the outcome of an education rights 
case may depend heavily on the language of the state constitution’s 
education article.”115  This language diversity in education clauses must be 
taken into account when analyzing different state systems.  The state 
constitutions can loosely be categorized by language focusing on equity116 
and language focusing on adequacy.117 
1.  Equity Language in Education Clauses 
A number of state education clauses use language either explicitly or 
implicitly mandating an equal educational opportunity.118  The most 
common language implying equality is the word “uniform.”  Fourteen 
states require that the state provide a uniform education: Arizona mandates 
a “general and uniform” system,119 Colorado requires “thorough and 
                                                                                                     
 111. See Hubsch, supra note 95, (highlighting the difficulties in defining the standards 
set forth in state education clauses). 
 112. See Gormley, supra note 78, at 213–14 (discussing the success of lawsuits 
challenging the constitutionality of states’ education funding schemes). 
 113. See id. at 215. 
 114. See Hubsch, supra note 95, at 1335 (explaining that the diverse descriptions 
provide a good source of state jurisprudence for education reform). 
 115. Id. 
 116 . See McUsic, supra note 86, at 320 (“The state constitutions may be categorized 
according to the strength of their support for an equity claim.”). 
 117. See id. at 326 (“Under a standards theory, a plaintiff argues that the education 
article of the state constitution mandates some absolute minimum level of education that 
certain districts are failing to meet.”). 
 118. See id. at 319 (stating that the language of some state constitutions requires that 
the state provide for an equal education). 
 119.  See ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (“The Legislature shall enact such laws as shall 
provide for the establishment and maintenance of a general and uniform public school 
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uniform,”120 Florida requires “uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high 
quality,”121 Idaho mandates a “general, uniform, and thorough” system,122 
five states require a “general and uniform” system (Indiana,123 North 
Carolina,124 Oregon,125 South Dakota,126 and Washington127), three states 
solely require uniformity (Nevada,128 Wisconsin,129 and North Dakota130), 
                                                                                                     
system . . . .”). 
 120. See COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (“The general assembly shall, as soon as practicable, 
provide for the establishment and maintenance of a thorough and uniform system of free 
public schools throughout the state, wherein all residents of the state, between the ages of six 
and twenty-one years, may be educated gratuitously.”). 
 121. See FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a) (“Adequate provision shall be made by law for a 
uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free public schools that allows 
students to obtain a high quality education and for the establishment, maintenance, and 
operation of institutions of higher learning and other public education programs that the 
needs of the people may require.”). 
 122. See IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“The stability of a republican form of government 
depending mainly upon the intelligence of the people, it shall be the duty of the legislature of 
Idaho, to establish and maintain a general, uniform and thorough system of public, free 
common schools.”). 
 123. See IND. CONST. art. 8, § 1 (“Knowledge and learning, generally diffused 
throughout a community, being essential to the preservation of a free government; it should 
be the duty of the General Assembly to encourage, by all suitable means, moral, intellectual 
scientific, and agricultural improvement; and provide, by law, for a general and uniform 
system of Common Schools, wherein tuition shall without charge, and equally open to all.”). 
 124. See N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (“The General Assembly shall provide by taxation 
and otherwise for a general and uniform system of free public schools, which shall be 
maintained at least nine months in every year, and wherein equal opportunities shall be 
provided for all students.”). 
 125. See ORE. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (“The Legislative Assembly shall provide by law 
for the establishment of a uniform, and general system of Common schools.”). 
 126. See S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (“The stability of a republican form of government 
depending on the morality and intelligence of the people, it shall be the duty of the 
Legislature to establish and maintain a general and uniform system of public schools 
wherein tuition shall be without charge, and equally open to all; and to adopt all suitable 
means to secure to the people the advantages and opportunities of education.”). 
 127. See WASH. CONST., art. IX, § 2 (“The legislature shall provide for a general and 
uniform system of public schools.  The public school system shall include common schools, 
and such high schools, normal schools, and technical schools as may hereafter be 
established.”). 
 128. See NEV. CONST. art. 11, § 2 (“The legislature shall provide for a uniform system 
of common schools, by which a school shall be established and maintained in each school 
district at least six months in every year . . . and the legislature may pass such laws as will 
tend to secure a general attendance of the children in each school district upon said public 
schools.”). 
 129. See WIS. CONST. art. X, § 3 (“The legislature shall provide by law for the 
establishment of district schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable . . .”). 
 130. See N.D. CONST. art. 8, § 2 (“The legislative assembly shall provide for a uniform 
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New Mexico mandates “uniform and sufficient”131 and Wyoming calls for a 
“complete and uniform” system.132 
Additionally, two of these states—New Mexico and North Carolina—
as well as two states with no uniformity requirement—Montana and 
Louisiana—have state constitutions that explicitly require education 
equality.133  New Mexico’s clause deals specifically with Hispanic children, 
stating that they “shall forever enjoy perfect equality with other children in 
all public schools.”134  However, as one scholar notes, “[a]lthough 
appearing limited in scope, the clause may have as broad an impact as a 
more general clause.  Since more school finance inequities occur primarily 
in minority schools, it is likely that a financing regime that would provide 
equality between Latinos and Anglos in New Mexico’s public schools 
would provide equality to all children.”135  The other three states provide 
for general equal opportunity:  Montana states that “[e]quality of 
educational opportunity is guaranteed to each person of the state,”136 
Louisiana’s constitution states that the purpose of the public educational 
system is so that “every individual may be afforded an equal opportunity to 
develop his full potential,”137 while North Carolina’s states that “equal 
opportunities shall be provided for students.”138 
                                                                                                     
system of free public schools throughout the state, beginning with the primary and extending 
through all grades up to and including schools of higher education . . . .”). 
 131. See N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 1 (“A uniform system of free public schools sufficient 
for the education of, and open to, all the children of school age in the state shall be 
established and maintained.”). 
 132. See WYO. CONST. art. 7, § 1 (“The legislature shall provide for the establishment 
and maintenance of a complete and uniform system of public instruction, embracing free 
elementary schools of every needed kind and grade, a university with such technical and 
professional departments as the public good may require and the means of the state allow, 
and such other institutions as may be necessary.”). 
 133. See McUsic, supra note 86, at 320 (“The first group of state constitutions—those 
of Montana, Louisiana, New Mexico, and North Carolina—provide the strongest 
commitment to equality, be actually using the word ‘equality’ in defining the state’s 
obligation.”). 
 134. N.M CONST. art. XII, § 10. 
 135. See McUsic, supra note 86, at 320. 
 136. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1(1). 
 137. LA. CONST. art. VIII, preamble. 
 138. N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2(1). 
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2.  Adequacy Language in Education Clauses 
A second line of state education clauses focuses on standards rather 
than equality, which formed the basis for “adequacy” claims during 
education finance reform.139  A number of states that use equity language 
fall into this category as well—Colorado, for example, requires its 
education system to be both “thorough and uniform.”140  Florida, Idaho, 
Minnesota, New Mexico, and Wyoming all also contain both equity and 
adequacy language in their education clauses. 
Few states explicitly call for adequacy—in fact, Georgia is the only 
state that does so.141  Montana mandates only that the education be 
“quality,”142 while Virginia specifies “high quality.”143  New Mexico calls 
for the system to be “sufficient.”144  Wyoming states that the education shall 
be “complete”145 and Louisiana simply mandates a “minimum foundation 
of education.”146  The majority of “adequacy” language constitutions, 
however, use the terms “thorough,” “efficient,” or both.  Colorado and 
Idaho specify “thorough” but have no efficiency language, Arkansas, 
Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, and Texas call for an “efficient” system with 
                                                                                                     
 139. See generally McUsic, supra note 86 (“Under a standards theory, a plaintiff argues 
that the education article of the state constitution mandates some absolute minimum level of 
education that certain districts are failing to meet.”). 
 140. See COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (“The general assembly shall, as soon as practicable, 
provide for the establishment and maintenance of a thorough and uniform system of free 
public schools throughout the state, wherein all residents of the state, between the ages of six 
and twenty-one years, may be educated gratuitously.”). 
 141. See GA. CONST. art. 8 (stating that “an adequate public education for the citizens 
shall be a primary obligation of the State of Georgia.”). 
 142. See MONT. CONST., art. X § 1. (“The legislature shall provide a basic system of 
free quality public elementary and secondary schools.”). 
 143. See VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1. (“The General Assembly shall provide for a system 
of free public elementary and secondary schools for all children of school age throughout the 
Commonwealth, and shall seek to ensure that an educational program of high quality is 
established and continually maintained.”). 
 144. See N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 1 (“A uniform system of free public schools sufficient 
for the education of, and open to, all the children of school age in the state shall be 
established and maintained.”). 
 145. See Wyo. CONST. art. 7, § 1 (“The legislature shall provide for the establishment 
and maintenance of a complete and uniform system of public instruction, embracing free 
elementary schools of every needed kind and grade, a university with such technical and 
professional departments as the public good may require and the means of the state allow, 
and such other institutions as may be necessary.”). 
 146. See LA. CONST. part. VIII §13 (stating that schools shall be funded “in order to 
insure a minimum foundation of education in all public elementary and secondary 
schools.”). 
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no “thorough” language.  Six states—Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia—all require the education system to 
be both “thorough and efficient.”  The most prevalent illustration of the 
“thorough and efficient” challenge occurred in New Jersey in Abbott v. 
Burk,147 which is the New Jersey Supreme Court’s twentieth opinion 
dealing with education finance.148  The series of opinions in the Abbot 
litigation has focused on one issue: whether the plaintiffs have been 
deprived of the right to a thorough and efficient education.149 
Other states, however, contain no qualifying language at all.  Nineteen 
states have education clauses phrased in very general terms.  Alaska, for 
example, states only that “the legislature shall by general law establish and 
maintain a system of public schools open to all children of the State.”150  
The other eighteen states without qualifying language contain similar 
clauses—mandating a system of public schools without providing any 
guidance as to the quality of those schools.  This lack of qualifying 
language, however, has not precluded courts from finding funding schemes 
unconstitutional.151  As discussed in the next section, courts have varied 
wildly from state to state on their interpretations of these qualifying 
phrases, or lack thereof. 
D.  Outcomes in Education Finance Reform 
1.  Education as a Fundamental Right 
Since 1971—the year of the first major school-funding suit—all but 
five states have addressed the constitutionality of their education financing 
systems.152  Often, the state courts’ decisions turned upon whether they 
                                                                                                     
 147. See Abbott v. Burke (Abbot XX), 971 A.2d 989 (N.J. 2009) (holding that the 
School Funding Reform Act was constitutional because it satisfied the requirements of the 
through and efficient education clause). 
 148. See McUsic, supra note 86, at 334 (summarizing the holding of major cases in 
education finance reform). 
 149. See Abbott, 971 A.2d at 991 (“Finding that more severely disadvantaged pupils 
require more resources for their education, the Court held that the State must develop a 
funding formula that would provide all children, including disadvantaged children in poorer 
urban districts, which an equal educational opportunity as measured by the Constitution’s 
thorough and efficient clause.”). 
 150. AK. CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
 151. See discussion infra Part III.D. 
 152. See Gormley, supra note 78, at 213–14 (“Since 1971, the year of the first major 
school-funding suit in California, litigants in forty-five states have challenged the 
constitutionality of their states’ educational funding schemes using the federal and state 
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found education to be a fundamental right; however, such a requirement 
was only dispositive when plaintiffs used an equity argument.153  Currently, 
twenty states have found that education is a fundamental right.154  Of those 
twenty states, courts of sixteen states invalidated their education finance 
systems as unconstitutional: Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, 
Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and 
Wyoming.155  Four states, however, upheld education finance systems 
despite finding a fundamental right to an education: Minnesota, Oklahoma, 
Virginia, and Wisconsin.156  The court in Minnesota, for example, found 
that education was a fundamental right, but that this right does not extend to 
the funding of the education system.157  The court in Virginia reached a 
similar conclusion.158  The Oklahoma Supreme Court found that education 
was a fundamental right, but that the legislature had sole discretion to 
decide how to distribute state funds.159  The court in Wisconsin found 
education to be a fundamental right, yet still used a rational basis standard, 
reasoning that plaintiffs had not been denied an equal opportunity for a 
sound basic education and thus no fundamental right was violated in the 
funding disparity.160 
                                                                                                     
constitutions.”). 
 153. See McUsic, supra note 86, at 313 (noting that invalidating an education finance 
system on the basis of an equity argument “virtually requires” that education be a 
fundamental right). 
 154. See EDUCATION JUSTICE, THE EDUCATION LAW CENTER, 
http://www.educationjustice.org/ (providing an overview of the education finance litigation 
in every state) (last visited Feb. 28, 2012). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. See Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn. 1993) (finding that students have a 
fundamental right to a “general and uniform” education, but that such a right does require 
full equalization of funding). 
 158. See Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 141–42 (Va. 1994) (holding that 
“education is a fundamental right under the Constitution,” but that “nowhere does the 
Constitution require equal, or substantially equal, funding or programs among and within the 
Commonwealth’s school divisions”). 
 159. See Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Oklahoma, Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135, 1149 (Ok. 
1987) (stating that children had a fundamental right to an adequate education according to 
standards set forth by the State Board of Education). 
 160. See Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 579 (1989) (finding that education was a 
fundamental right but that funding disparities did not implicate the right). 
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2.  The Rejection of Education as a Fundamental Right 
Coincidentally, just as many states as have found education to be a 
fundamental right have rejected the claim that education is a fundamental 
right—twenty states currently hold that education is not a fundamental right 
under state educational clauses.161  Of those twenty, fourteen states have 
upheld their financing systems as constitutional:  Alaska, Colorado, Florida, 
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, 
Nebraska, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island.162  Six of the twenty 
have determined that education is not a fundamental right but have 
nonetheless overturned their state financing systems: Arkansas, Kansas, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Ohio, and Tennessee.163  An additional three 
states have not addressed the fundamental right issue but have still 
overturned their financing systems (Maine, New Mexico, and Vermont), 
while two states have pending legislation.164 
No patterns emerge, however, between a state’s constitutional 
provision and that state’s success in overturning its education financing 
system.  States overturning their finance systems have equity language 
(Arizona, North Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota, Washington, and 
Wyoming), adequacy language (Kentucky, Montana, Texas, and West 
Virginia), both equity and adequacy language (Wyoming and New 
Mexico), and some have no qualifying language at all (Alabama, 
California, Connecticut, Missouri, New Hampshire, New York, Maine, and 
Vermont).165 
This lack of a clear pattern, while certainly suggesting that there is no 
specific formula that courts use in overturning education systems, illustrates 
that reform is possible even when states do not consider education a 
fundamental right, nor does reform require specific language in the state’s 
education provision.  The diversity of the education finance outcomes 
suggests that both equity and adequacy arguments could be used to overturn 
“last hired, first fired” mandates.  The two cases examined below illustrate 
the emerging jurisprudence in this area:  the first is an adequacy claim, 
which recent scholarship has hailed as the education reform argument du 
jour.  The second is the only case to have addressed the constitutionality of 
                                                                                                     
 161. See EDUCATION JUSTICE, supra note 154. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See supra Section III.C. 
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“last hired, first fired” systems specifically and which, despite the current 
success of adequacy claims, uses an equity argument to overturn “last hired, 
first fired” systems in the Los Angeles Unified School District. 
E.  The Emerging Jurisprudence 
1.  Campaign for Fiscal Equality v. New York 
The first case study provides an illustration of how courts have 
successfully overturned education systems based on an adequacy argument.  
While no court has yet overturned “last hired, first fired” policies based on 
an adequacy argument, the use of adequacy in finance reform could easily 
be shifted to “last hired, first fired” reform, as illustrated by the case 
below.166  The shift to adequacy broadened the scope of interpretation 
because, though the issue was still finance reform, the focus was no longer 
a comparison of monetary distributions, and instead shifted to whether the 
state had fulfilled its constitutional obligation to provide a certain quality of 
educational opportunity.167 
A leading New York case in adequacy litigation, Campaign for Fiscal 
Equity, Inc. v. State168 illustrates how the evolution from adequacy to equity 
claims opens the door for “last hired, first fired” reform.  Though the case 
addressed finance problems, the trial court’s (CFE II) definition of 
adequacy moved beyond monetary challenges, defining an adequate 
education in terms of basic skills necessary for civic participation. 169  In 
2003, the Court of Appeals—the highest court in New York—affirmed the 
lower courts and emphasized educational “inputs” as the primary measure 
of adequacy.170  As one scholar notes, “[t]he New York Court of Appeals 
made three crucial interpretive choices:  to entertain an adequacy case, to 
define adequacy in terms of schools’ role in preparing children for their role 
as citizens, and to measure adequacy using education inputs identified by 
                                                                                                     
 166. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1995), 
discussed infra. 
 167. See Hubsch, supra note 95, at 1325 (describing the evolution of education finance 
reform challenges from equity to adequacy). 
 168. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, 655 N.E.2d at 661 (holding that underfunded schools 
denied children of their right to an adequate educational opportunity). 
 169.  Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 719 N.Y.S.2d 475 (Sup. Ct. 2001) 
[hereinafter CFE II Trial]. 
 170. See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 100 N.Y.2d 893 (N.Y. 2003) 
[hereinafter CFE II]. 
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the court itself, mixed with education outputs.”171  The court determined 
that an adequacy argument was not too vague to entertain, defining 
adequacy as “the basic literacy, calculating, and verbal skills necessary to 
enable children to eventually function productively as civic participants 
capable of voting a serving on a jury.”172 
Notably, the court focused on educational “inputs” rather than 
educational “outputs.”173  The court based adequacy on curriculum 
implementation, school buildings, class size, and—most importantly to this 
discussion—the quality of teachers, stating that “minimally adequate 
teaching” was a constitutional requirement.174  Though the court in CFE II 
measured teacher quality by the number of certified teachers, certification 
exam results, and undergraduate education,175 it is not a far leap from 
inadequacy based on these measurements to inadequacy based on “last 
hired, first fired” policies.  The CFE case therefore marks an important shift 
toward education inputs as the primary measure of adequacy, rather than 
outputs or some measure designed by the legislature.176  The CFE decision 
consequently illustrates a trend toward education inputs—and specifically 
teacher quality—as a measure of adequacy, creating viable groundwork for 
input-based reform focusing on “last hired, first fired” policies. 
2.  Reed v. California 
Despite the current trend of adequacy claims in education reform, the 
first and only court to specifically address “last hired, first fired” reform 
reverted back to an equity rather than an adequacy argument.177  As the 
decision notes, the equity claim succeeds because California considers 
education a fundamental right.178 
In January 2011, the California Superior Court approved a class action 
settlement halting “last hired, first fired” layoffs in Los Angeles public 
                                                                                                     
 171. See Kagan, supra note 81, at 2245. 
 172.  See id. 
 173. See CFE II at 919 (stating that improved inputs yield better student performance). 
 174. See id. at 492–500. 
 175. See id. 
 176. See Kagan, supra note 81, at 2241 (“Thus, the judiciary’s consideration of inputs 
would form the primary measure of adequacy, rather than pure reliance on outputs or some 
other legislatively crafted measure.”). 
 177. See Reed v. State, No. BC432420 1, 1 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2011)  
 178. See id. at 12 (describing the impact on students’ fundamental right to an 
education). 
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schools.179  The settlement resulted from a claim brought by parents of 
children in three inner-city schools, arguing that state-mandated seniority 
based layoff policies violated their children’s state constitutional right to an 
equal and adequate educational opportunity.180  Pursuant to Education Code 
section 44955 and its collective bargaining agreement, the Los Angeles 
Unified School District (LAUSD) had administered teacher layoffs in 
reverse-seniority order.181  In May 2010, before the settlement, the court 
issued a preliminary injunction to prevent layoffs, finding that “Plaintiffs 
had shown a really and appreciable impact on their constitutional right to an 
equal educational opportunity and that there was no compelling interest 
justifying the seniority-based layoffs at Plaintiffs’ schools.”182 
While the equal educational opportunity has traditionally been used in 
support of finance reform, the California Superior Court interpreted the 
term to include “the failure to deliver in the classroom.”183  In approving the 
settlement, the court relied on evidence that high teacher turnover “destroys 
the teacher support infrastructure necessary for the quality delivery of 
educational content . . . destroys the student-teacher relationship necessary 
to deliver quality education . . . [and] is associated with low standardized 
scores.”184  The court found that because of these problems, students’ 
educational opportunities were compromised.185  According to the court, the 
fact that the seniority layoff system was the result of a union bargaining 
agreement made no difference:  “Under no circumstance can LAUSD 
bargain away students’ constitutional rights.”186 
In setting forth the unconstitutionality of “last hired, first fired” 
reform, the court first looked to the state constitution’s education clause.  
Though California is one of the nineteen states with no qualifying language 
in its constitution, California nonetheless considers education to be a 
fundamental right.187  As such, the court stated that “[t]he California 
                                                                                                     
 179. See id. at 1. 
 180. See Osmond, supra note 64 (summarizing the settlement approval in Reed). 
 181. See Reed, No. BC432420 at 1 (giving the background on the settlement decision). 
 182. Id. at 1. 
 183. See Reed v. State, No. BC432420 1, 1 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2011) (“In its 
reductions in force (RIFs) in 2009 and again in 2010, LAUSD administered teacher layoffs 
in reverse-seniority order pursuant to Education Code section 44955 and its collective 
bargaining agreement.”). 
 184. See id. at 25–27. 
 185. See id. at 29 (“The evidence clearly demonstrates the impact of layoffs at 
struggling LAUSD schools.”). 
 186. See id. at 4. 
 187. See id. at 3 (stating that education is a fundamental right in California) (citing Butt 
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Constitution guarantees to all California public school students a 
fundamental right to basic equality of educational opportunity.”188  After 
finding that the high teacher turnover was detrimental to the quality of 
educational opportunities afforded, the court then used an equity argument 
to illustrate why the school district’s seniority-based layoff system was 
unconstitutional.189  Because California considers education a fundamental 
right, the court applied strict scrutiny.190  The court found that purely 
seniority-based layoffs fell disproportionately on schools that were already 
struggling academically, and found no compelling interest justifying the 
policies191 As such, the court found that the district’s seniority-based RIFs 
violated the plaintiffs’ “fundamental constitutional right to a basic 
education (a right cognizable as a subset of constitutional equal protection 
rights).”192 
IV.  Proposal:  Applying Finance Reform Strategies to Effect “Last Hired, 
First Fired” Reform 
The evolution of education finance reform, states’ abilities to broadly 
construe their education clauses, and the emerging jurisprudence set forth 
above all illustrate that both the equity and adequacy strategies utilized in 
education finance reform can be used by state courts to effect “last hired, 
first fired” reform. 
A.  Applying Finance Reform Strategies:  Equity v. Adequacy 
The analysis of the CFE and Reed decisions illustrates that courts have 
two viable options in effecting last hired reform—both an equity argument 
and an adequacy argument.193  The move from equity to adequacy in 
                                                                                                     
v. State, 4 Cal. 4th 668 (1992). 
 188. See id. at 2 (internal quotations omitted). 
 189. See Reed v. State, No. BC432420 1, 27–28 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2011) 
(noting the devastating effects of teacher turnover, which result in children being denied an 
equal educational opportunity). 
 190. See id. at 3 (finding that “strict scrutiny is triggered under equal protection because 
of the fundamental right of education”). 
 191. See id. at 32 (“LAUSD’s data show that LAUSD’s academically struggling 
schools receive a disproportionate share of layoffs.”). 
 192. See id. at 6. 
 193. See discussion supra Part III.E.1–2 (comparing the adequacy approach in CFE to 
the equity approach in Reed). 
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education reform was not a clear shift, but instead resulted in cases in which 
the courts addressed both claims.194  As Koski notes: “[t]hat courts often 
intertwined the language of equity and adequacy demonstrates both their 
inability to articulate a clear standard for constitutional compliance and 
their desire to maintain flexibility in school finance jurisprudence.”195  This 
flexibility allows for two possible solutions:  an equity claim for states that 
consider education a fundamental right and an adequacy claim for those 
that do not. 
1.  The Equity Argument 
With regard to states the consider education to be a fundamental right, 
the analysis of Reed suggests that an equity argument would prove to be the 
most viable option.196  As previously noted, equity arguments in finance 
reform sought equality of funding for all school districts.197  The decision in 
Reed, however, illustrates that such a claim works for education “inputs” 
such as teacher quality as well.198 As such, equity claims lend themselves 
well to “last hired, first fired reform.”  As discussed supra Part III.D.1, 
equity arguments are virtually limited to those states that consider education 
a fundamental right.199  Thus for the twenty states recognizing education as 
a fundamental right, the equity claim provides the strongest argument for 
“last hired, first fired” reform.200  The twenty states rejecting education as a 
fundamental right—as well as the eight states that have not addressed the 
issue—nevertheless have the ability to effect reform through an adequacy 
claim. 
2.  The Adequacy Argument 
States rejecting education as a fundamental right still have an 
alternative remedy for reform.  As illustrated by the fact that more than a 
quarter of the states rejecting education as a fundamental right nonetheless 
                                                                                                     
 194. See supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text (discussing the murky line 
between equity and adequacy claims). 
 195. Koski, supra note 98, at 1187–88. 
 196. See  discussion supra Part III.E.2 (analyzing the equity claim in Reed). 
 197. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
 198. See supra notes 184–188 and accompanying text (noting that in Reed the court 
determined that teacher quality affected a student’s fundamental right to an education). 
 199. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
 200. See discussion supra Part III.D.1 (providing an overview of the states that 
recognize education as a fundamental right). 
500 19 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 469 (2013) 
overturned their financing systems as unconstitutional illustrates the fact 
that “last hired, first fired” reform is not limited to states that consider 
education a fundamental right.201  As illustrated by the New York court’s 
opinion in CFE, adequacy claims, like equity claims, can move beyond 
monetary challenges to focus on more qualitative inputs, such as adequate 
curriculum, class size, and teacher quality202—all factors that are adversely 
affected by seniority-based layoff policies.203  The court’s focus on “inputs” 
as the primary measure of adequacy provides solid groundwork for 
adequacy based “last hired, first fired” reform.204 
Equity and adequacy claims thus prove to be equally viable—and very 
similar—options for “last hired, first fired” reform.  As Koski notes, 
however, “[t]hat courts have fused their equity and adequacy analyses 
suggests not only that the supposed demarcation between ‘second wave’ 
equity cases and ‘third wave’ adequacy cases is not so distinct, but also that 
courts instrumentally adopt either equity or adequacy analyses to meet their 
own policy objectives and maintain their institutional legitimacy and role in 
state governance.”  Such a comment highlights the main critique and 
biggest hurdle for “last hired, first fired” reform—the claim that such 
reform is akin to judicial activism.205 
B.  Overcoming Challenges to Reform 
1.  The Least Dangerous Branch? 
As previously noted, “last hired, first fired” advocates will face the 
challenge of judicial deference to state legislature.206  In light of the Reed 
decision, some legal academics have predicted that this judicial intervention 
in education reform could “inspire a new wave of litigation to improve this 
                                                                                                     
 201. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (noting that of the twenty states 
rejecting education as a fundamental right, six still overturned their education financing 
systems as unconstitutional). 
 202. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
 203. See discussion supra Part II.C. (illustrating the negative effects of seniority-based 
layoff policies). 
 204. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (noting the shift toward input-based 
standards of adequacy). 
 205. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (noting that advocates of “last hired, 
first fired” reform will have to overcome the argument that education adequacy is largely a 
legislative issue). 
 206. See discussion supra Part III.B. (analyzing the role of state legislatures in 
education reform). 
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country’s troubled schools.”207  David Gregory, a law professor at St. 
John’s College called the decision “a shifting of the tectonic plates . . . [i]f 
this were to move forward, every major district in the country is going to 
look to this as the model . . . It would be the most innovative system in the 
country. . . .”208  This case, some say, could provide the transition from 
education finance reform to a new wave of quality reform.209 
An obvious critique of this predicted solution is the threat of judicial 
activism.210  The critique is one of checks and balances:  “[I]f the court 
abuses its power and intrudes in areas reserved to the other branches, there 
is no ‘check’ within the constitution itself to bring the courts back into the 
fold . . . Therefore, the potential for judicial ‘tyranny’ from adequacy suits 
is very real. . . .”211 
In The Least Dangerous Branch?  Consequences of Judicial Activism, 
Stephen Powers and Stanley Rothman present a critique of judicial activism 
in general, but address education specifically in the context of Brown v. 
Board of Ed.212  Though the critique focuses on federal courts, the general 
contentions are easily applied to the state courts at issue in education 
reform.213  Powers and Rothman look specifically at Brown and the wide-
spread use of busing as a means of desegregating schools, calling it “[o]ne 
of the more protracted, complex, and controversial court-initiated 
policies.”214  They contend that evidence illustrates how busing was a 
narrow and simplistic response to a large social problem.215  Linking the 
example to a broader critique of judicial activism, they state that “the 
principles advanced by the courts were less problematic than the remedies 
that they often imposed in their wake, [leading to] unintended consequences 
that did not necessarily serve even the interests of the intended beneficiaries 
                                                                                                     
 207. Osmond, supra note 64. 
 208.  Simone Wilson, L.A. Teachers Union Loses Historic Lawsuit to ACLU: No More 
‘Last Hired, First Fired,’ L.A. Weekly (Jan. 21, 2011), http://blogs.laweekly.com 
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of these changes in law and policy.”216  This critique, however, focuses 
primarily on the judiciary’s intervention into the means of reform.  As such, 
it can be distinguished from the judicial intervention in later education 
reform in which the courts limited their decisions to findings of 
constitutional inadequacy but left the means for reform to the legislature.217  
If courts, in reforming “last hired, first fired” policies, limit their decisions 
to constitutional findings, they avoid the risk of judicial activism and 
therefore remain an appropriate vehicle for reform.  Examining whether 
“last hired, first fired” policies are inadequate remains strictly a question of 
constitutional interpretation, in which the courts clearly have authority.  In 
limiting decisions to this question, then, the courts would not overstep into 
determining what policies the legislature must use to provide an adequate 
education. 
Koski contends that the judiciary, rather than being an inappropriate 
vehicle for reform, is uniquely suited to do just that:  “Because courts do 
not need to be responsive to majoritarian politics and because their 
decision-making is based on constitutional text and values . . . court 
participation in social policy-making through judicial review is not only 
legitimate, it is necessary to ensure the just treatment of all individuals and 
groups in a democracy.”218  Koski argues that even judges who are not 
elected are checked by more than the vague notion of “separation of 
powers.”219  Instead, even electorally unaccountable judges are checked by 
the notion that if their decisions are not viewed by the public as legitimate, 
they run the risk of being ignored and consequently ineffective.220  As such, 
courts have inevitably become part of the educational policy-making 
landscape in spite of the fact that this role of the judiciary places the power 
in the hands of a select few, possibly unelected, officials.221  In spite of 
criticism, the recent trend has been an increasing level of judicial 
                                                                                                     
 216. Id. at 58. 
 217. See, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (1989) (holding 
that Kentucky’s entire education system was unconstitutional in that inequitable financing 
had adversely affected students in the state, but leaving the means of reform to the state 
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 218. Koski, supra note 98, at 798. 
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appropriate but rather under what conditions it is necessary and effective). 
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involvement; as the modern state becomes more administrative and 
managerial, judicial policy making becomes more and more necessary.222 
2.  Taking Reed Beyond California 
The second major challenge to “last hired, first fired” reform involves 
taking the court’s landmark reform in Reed beyond the California borders.  
As previously discussed, many state courts have been successful in 
overturning unconstitutional education finance decisions, but California is 
the only state to specifically address “last hired, first fired” reform.223  Legal 
scholarship on education reform, however, suggests that state courts when 
interpreting state constitutional provisions, states often look beyond their 
own jurisdictions to those with similar clauses.224  As one scholar notes, 
“[w]hile one state’s interpretation may legitimately vary from another’s 
based on a different history, state courts would lose valuable resources if 
they did not look beyond their borders to the history and interpretation of 
other states’ similar clauses.225  As previously discussed, many states share 
similar qualifying language in their education provisions, focusing on terms 
such as “general,” “uniform,” and “efficient.”226  Because “the discursive 
context of state education clauses lies in other states’ clauses, the shared 
history that led states to adopt such clauses, and subsequent development of 
those clauses,” it follows that state constitutional interpretation considers 
other relevant state clauses.227  As such, “last hired, first fired” reform is not 
destined to remain inside California’s borders. 
V.  Conclusion 
Since the rejection of education as a federal constitutional right in 
Rodriguez, states have taken it upon themselves to provide students with an 
educational opportunity.  “Last hired, first fired” policies interfere with a 
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 224. See Kagan, supra note 81, at 2260 (stating that Justice Robert R. Utter of the 
Washington Supreme Court suggested that “an innovative state court can create a laboratory 
for constitutional interpretation applicable to other states.”). 
 225. See id. 
 226. See discussion supra Part III.C. (analyzing the language of state education 
clauses). 
 227. See Kagan, supra note 81, at 2260. 
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student’s education opportunity, regardless of whether a state regards the 
right as fundamental.  From an adequacy standpoint, these policies result in 
inadequate teacher quality and curriculum through high turnover rates, as 
well as an increased classroom size.  From an equity standpoint, these 
policies adversely affect the low-income, inner-city schools that already lag 
behind in educational performance. 
Through their education clauses, states have a viable tool with which 
to reform these policies.  The flexibility of the language itself, coupled with 
courts’ ability to broadly interpret these clauses in education finance 
reform, suggest that courts may use these clauses to effect “last hired, first 
fired” reform.  The emerging jurisprudence sets forth a solid ground upon 
which state courts can bring both equity and adequacy claims to enjoin this 
harmful policy. 
